By Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Professor of Public International Law at the University of the Aegean, coeditor of A Comparison of the European, Inter-American, African and Arab Human Rights Courts: Institutional Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press / Springer 2025)

  1. Introduction

On 26 June 2025, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) delivered its Ruling on jurisdiction and admissibility in Application No. 007/2023, Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC] v Republic of Rwanda (Ruling). For several reasons, this is a very interesting case. First, because the next day DRC and Rwanda, following the April 2025 conclusion of a ‘Declaration of Principles’, signed an agreement in the US capital to end hostilities (Peace Agreement).[1] Second, this is the first inter-state case to be heard by the ACtHPR. Third, the case concerns a complex and prolonged armed conflict between neighbouring African states, unfortunately a common phenomenon in the continent going back to the aftermath of the decolonization struggle. Fourth, twenty five years earlier DRC had complained before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on human rights abuses committed by foreign armed forces in its territory. The Commission did conclude that the armed forces of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda had violated, inter alia, the right to self-determination, the right to development and the right to peace and security, as protected by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).[2] Fifth, as will be explained, the Ruling seems to have overturned established case law. Sixth, because the UN Security Council (UNSC) has regarded that the present situation in the DRC constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region.

It follows that for the resolution of the DRC-Rwanda conflict there has been a diplomatic process through the US administration’s mediation and a judicial process before the ACtHPR, even though regional human rights courts are not mandated and are not ordinarily competent to rule on inter-state conflicts and alleged violations of the norms of international law, in other words they are not international courts of general jurisdiction. The two processes neither appear to be inter-linked nor are they linked to the relevant  UNSC Chapter VII action, including Resolution 2783(2025) and Resolution 2773(2025). However, both the diplomatic and the international judicial methods for resolving inter-state disputes (even taking the form of inter-state application before a regional  human rights court) contribute towards finding a solution, which should ideally (a) prevent it from escalating into full war, (b) address the harm done to the population, to destroyed public facilities and infrastructure, etc., and (c) determine any claims advanced for reparation/compensation. Their difference, of course, is that diplomatic solutions are not binding for the parties to the dispute, whereas any judicial resolution is binding a priori.

  1. The facts of the case – DRC allegations and demands – Rwanda’s objections and DRC’s counterarguments

The application was lodged on 21 August 2023. DRC accused Rwanda of human rights violations against its population, including large scale massacre, internal displacement, destruction of infrastructure, looting and destruction of property, etc.. They were acts, which allegedly breached the African Charter and other human rights instruments over which the ACtHPR has jurisdiction, and were perpetrated during the armed conflict that broke out in November 2021 between the DRC and a coalition formed by the Mouvement Du 23 Mars (M23) and the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF). M23 is an armed rebel group operating in the DRC, which is widely believed to receive  military supplies, training, etc. from RDF. Since December 2012, M23 has been on the UN Security Council Sanctions List pursuant to paragraph 4 of Resolution 2078(2012) for atrocities committed against the DRC population, for forced recruitment of children, for causing regional instability, etc.[3]

The list of alleged violations by Rwanda, which the DRC asked the ACtHPR to confirm, is too long. Suffice to mention the following: the obligation to respect and protect human rights (Article 1 of the African Charter and Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the rights to life and physical integrity (Article 4 of the African Charter, Article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women, Article 5(1) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and Article 6(1) of the ICCPR); the prohibition of slavery, human trafficking, torture and cruel or degrading treatment (Article 5 of the African Charter, Articles 3(1) and (2) of the Protocol on Women’s Rights, and Articles 7 and 8 of the ICCPR); the right to liberty and security of persons ( Article 6 of the African Charter and Articles 9(1) and 12(1) of the ICCPR); the right to property (Article 14 of the African Charter); the right to protection of the family (Article 18(1) of the African Charter); the right to food (Articles 4, 16 and 22 of the African Charter, Article 15 of the Protocol on Women’s Rights); and the right to a satisfactory environment favourable to development (Article 24 of the African Charter and Article 18(1) of the Protocol on Women’s Rights).

Moreover, the DRC asked that the ACtHPR order Rwanda: (a) to withdraw all troops from its territory and cease forthwith supporting M23 so as to terminate the human rights violations for which the ACtHPR will have found Rwanda to be responsible; (b) to pay reparation for any resulting harm; (c) to fulfill any other reparation measures ordered by the ACtHPR; and (d) to reimburse DRC’s legal costs.

Rwanda raised a multifaceted objection to the ACtHPR’ s jurisdiction. It claimed, inter alia, that it lacked material jurisdiction because: (a) there was no dispute between the two countries and none was claimed by the DRC; (b) certain instruments invoked by the DRC were not human rights instruments but related to the use of force and the maintenance of international peace and security (namely, UN Charter,  Constitutive Act of the African Union, Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region[4],  Framework Agreement on Peace, Security and Cooperation for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (2013)); and (c) Rwanda was not a party to some of the instruments to which DRC relied on. Finally, Rwanda submitted that the ACtHPR lacked territorial jurisdiction.

The DRC counter-argued that proof of a dispute with Rwanda was not required; it was sufficient that the alleged violations concerned  rights protected by the African Charter and other human rights treaties. Moreover, the instruments referred to by Rwanda as not coming with the ACtHPR’s jurisdiction were ‘human rights protection instruments’. DRC interpreted this term as instruments, which do not necessarily deal exclusively with human rights, but they nevertheless ‘expressly enunciate subjective rights accruing to individuals’ or impose obligations on contracting parties aiming at ensuring the enjoyment of those rights.

  1. The ACtHPR Ruling

The ACtHPR held that, pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter that established it (1998), it has been endowed with jurisdiction whenever an applicant alleges violations of human rights protected by the African Charter or other human rights instruments to which the state concerned is a contracting party.[5] In dismissing Rwanda’s objection, it affirmed that its jurisdiction to hear a case is not subject to any formal requirement regarding proof of existence of a dispute prior to filing the application before it. The ACtHPR explained that its characteristics make it a different international court than the International Court of Justice, where the existence of a (legal) dispute is conditio sine qua non.  

As regards Rwanda’s second objection, the ACtHPR said that all rights, over which the DRC alleged violations, are protected by the African Charter, the Protocol on Women’s Rights and the ICCPR (see above). These were ‘manifestly human rights protection instruments which [the ACtHPR ] applies’. Therefore, they are sufficient to establish its jurisdiction without having to determine whether the other instruments relied upon by the DRC were human rights protection instruments or not. But, the ACtHPR went on to say, there was nothing to prevent it from ruling on this very question.[6]

Echoing the definition that the DRC had given, it held that an instrument is a human rights instrument, if its purpose is stated, which purpose must be defined either by express enunciation of subjective rights accruing to individuals or groups of individuals, or by imposing obligations on contracting parties entailing the consequent enjoyment of the same rights. Applying this test to the DRC-invoked instruments, the Pact of the Great Lakes Region was held to be a human rights protection instrument, but not the UN Charter, the AU Constitutive Act, and the Framework Agreement on Peace.[7] As regards the latter, it should be noted that it is not a (binding) treaty, rather a political declaration with self-imposed commitments and milestones.

However, excluding the AU Constitutive Act is problematic as it arguably overturns established case law. The Act’s Preamble and specific provisions commit the African Union and its Member States to human rights protection. In Application No. 007/2013, Mohamed Abubakri v. Tanzania, Judgment (Merits), 3 June 2016, the ACtHPR held that applications must also be compatible with the Constitutive Act (a mandatory condition under Article 56 of the African Charter, reproduced in Rule 50(2) ACtHPR Rules) and that alleged violations ‘are susceptible to be examined by reference to [the Act’s] provisions. In that case, it found that the alleged violations came under the African Charter and the Act, which in Articles 3(h) and 4(m) stipulates the promotion, protection and respect of human rights as an AU’s fundamental principle and objective.  However, as  the AU is not a party to the African Charter, the ACtHPR has held that the AU and its organs cannot be respondents.[8]

  1. Conclusions

As regards the judicial resolution of the DRC-Rwanda dispute, the ACtHPR should deliver its judgment on merits and reparations sometime in 2026.  While it will have to answer difficult questions, e.g. whether Rwanda is responsible for the alleged violations committed by a non-stare actor (M23) and must compensate the victims in DRC, the determinations that it will reach should deal with crucial issues of responsibility and accountability. And, more importantly, both the DRC and Rwanda must accept and implement the operative part of the ACtHPR judgment.

As regards the Peace Agreement, it hangs in the balance, a stark reminder that armed conflicts in Africa are seldom fully resolved, usually they pause only to be reignited. In late 2025, the DRC and Rwandan Presidents met again in the US capital, affirmed their ‘unwavering commitment to peaceful relations, mutual respect, and cooperation’ and signed another document, the Regional Economic Integration Framework, which, together with the previous instruments, are known as the ‘Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity’.[9] Whether these instruments will be followed or ignored remains to be seen. Last but not least, one should also not ignore the findings made and measures ordered by the UNSC, if not for any other reason because in the DRC – Rwanda conflict it has already exercised its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security (Article 24 UN Charter).

[1] Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, Washington, 27 June 2025. It is not subject to ratification.

[2] See Communication 227/99, Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Decision, 29 May 2003.

[3] It was added on the List by the Security Council Committee established under Resolution 1533(2004) ‘Democratic Republic of Congo’, 12 March 2004.

[4] It was adopted in December 2006, entered into force in June 2008, and was amended in November 2012.

[5] See L.R. Glas, ‘Sources of Law’ in A. Almutawa and Κ. Magliveras (eds), A Comparison of the European, Inter-American, African and Arab Human Rights Courts: Institutional Aspects, T.M.C. Asser Press / Springer, 2025, 73-97, 84.

[6] Ruling, paras 107 et seq.  

[7] Ruling, paras 111-112.

[8] Application No. Application 014/2024, Aliyu Suleiman v African Union & African Union Commission, Ruling (Jurisdiction) 12 February 2025, paras 12 et seq.

[9] Joint Declaration by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda on the Occasion of Establishing the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity, Washington, 4 December 2025.