Ali Alabdali is a legal professional specializing in international law, with experience in diplomacy and international organizations. He currently holds an LLM from UC Berkeley and an LLB from City University of London and has started a PhD in public international law at Utrecht University
Unlike its international status, international law is not representative of all legal norms of the world but in its core, it possesses structural inequalities and biases that result in the supremacy of a few legal systems from one region in comparison to other regions.
Structural Barriers in Internships
One of these structural barriers can be seen in the accessibility of internships with international organizations in global hubs such as New York, Geneva, and Vienna. While many of these opportunities are often promoted as merit-based and open to all qualified applicants, the reality reveals certain systemic hurdles. Many internships at the United Nations in New York, for example, are unpaid, and participation is contingent upon securing appropriate U.S. visas, a process that is generally more straightforward for U.S. citizens or students already based in the country, but far more complex and costly for applicants from developing states. Similarly, in Geneva and Vienna, unpaid internships with UN agencies or international organizations present fewer barriers for EU citizens, who often benefit from simplified visa processes and greater mobility rights. By contrast, candidates from the “Global South” frequently face additional administrative requirements, higher financial burdens, and practical challenges related to relocation and visa approval. These factors, while not explicitly exclusionary, inevitably influence who is realistically able to access such formative professional experiences. A report in 2019 on UN internships highlighted that over 64 % of interns were from high income countries compared to 2% from low-income countries and 12% from lower-middle income countries. Furthermore, between 2014-2023, out of the top 10 nationalities of interns, only one was from Africa, compared to six from North America and Europe.
Structural Barriers embedded within the ICJ system
Since its formation, the Statute of the International Court of Justice includes verbiage that reflects structural barriers in international law towards the Global South.
For example, the language of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute lists “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a source of international law. Nevertheless, the use of the word “civilized” reflects an enduring historical hierarchy, that was added to the Statute to differentiate between the principal legal systems of the western countries and all other states (ie Global South). The former president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Judge Joan Donoghue, said in a statement before the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that the ICJ Statute “needs to be stripped of verbiage” that insinuates that some States are “civilized” whereas others are not. While modern applications and discussions of Article 38(1)(c) have refrained from using the “civilised” terminology, the word’s history lingers in the structures of international law making.
Another structural bias in the ICJ Statute is that French is an official language of the Court in accordance with Article 39. This indicates that staff of the Court and fellows should possess working knowledge of French, in addition to English which is currently the global language that every country teaches it in its school system. This instantly eliminates many applicants from the Global South countries, where French is not their national language, or who were not colonised by a French-speaking country, which is over two-thirds of the Global South. In a way, the Court is punishing countries in the Global South that were not colonised by a French-speaking country, by reducing their chances of being employed by the Court.
Choosing French as an official language of the Court has far-reaching consequences as it affects the Court’s structure, which influences the substantive law it produces. Language choices affect the process of staff screening and how judicial opinions are developed. This affects non-native speakers and provides numerous advantages to native speakers, and has severe implications on the judgements rendered. This results in discriminatory screening in the recruitment process, more power to French-native legal officers, and an influence of French jurisprudence in the framework and judgements of the ICJ. According to a previous legal officer at the ICJ in an interview, “one of the essential reasons why I was hired in the face of competition was my capacity to write in the two [court] languages.”
To showcase statistics of the effect of this structural bias, according to the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) of the UNGA in 2024, the staff members of the Court are predominantly from one regional group, that of Western Europe and other States. The ACABQ stressed that the Court needs to “achieve a more equitable geographical representation of Member States” as out of 61 staff members of the Court, citizens from Western Europe and other States occupied 72% of the positions, compared to 9% from Latin America and the Caribbean, 6% from Asia and the Pacific, and less than 5% from Africa. The result is legal officers, who tremendously assist judges in development of reasoning in the judgements, tend to use terminology that conforms to the French way of writing; and according to a former legal officer at the ICJ this “privileges the transfer of concepts and ideas from municipal legal orders into international law.” To clarify, this is related to staff appointed by the Court rather than judges politically elected by the General Assembly and Security Council.
Moreover, in regards to the ICJ Fellowship Programme at the ICJ, which provides an opportunity for junior professionals to work at the Court for a year, there was only one fellow from a university located in the Global South in both 2019 and 2020 out of 15 fellows. The reaction was the creation of a trust fund in 2021 by the UN to allow participants from universities in the Global South to participate in the Programme. The result is that in 2021 two fellows from universities from the Global South participated, 4 in 2022 and 2023, and 5 in 2024. Nevertheless, the funds that exist are on a voluntary basis and any time the fund is depleted, many talented fellows from universities in the Global South will not participate. Such structural bias ensures that many legal talents from the Global South rely on the finances of many countries in the “Global North”.
The above shows that the structure biases in international law results in an entrenchment of power imbalance of the Global North compared to the Global South.
Towards Genuine and Tangible Reform
Such entrenchment of power imbalance and the overwhelming presence of the Global North in international law is harmful to international law and international organisations as a whole. The reason is that such imbalance leads to a unilateral and selective interpretation and application of international law that will eventually lead to its fragmentation due to a loss of trust.
For example, the ICJ’s stature as an international court was questioned with regard to its approach in analysing the historical context in the Advisory Opinion on the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Although the Court found that Israel violated international law in regard to the OPT, the Court failed to address the Nakba, the problems arising from it, or the root causes behind the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Furthermore, the Court failed to contextualise the nexus between Israel’s actions and restrictions on the rights of Palestinians in light of the historical and political division between the two. This is not surprising, as of the 15 judges who delivered the Opinion, only one, President Nawaf Salam, was from the Middle East and truly understands the historical, political, and legal dynamics. In this regard, the Court should adopt programs to train the judges on various legal systems of the world and employ legal officers, associate officers, assistants, and fellows that represent every legal jurisdiction of the world in every given year.
It is submitted that including the talents of the Global South in international judicial institutions would result in a diverse workforce that would develop international law from many approaches and lead to a law that truly reflects the various legal civilisations, perspectives, and experiences of the world.
In this regard, Diplomats from the Global South (DGS) who are state members to international organisations are the primary actors responsible for change. DGS have a responsibility to advocate more about removing the structural barriers that hinder their nationals’ participation in international law fora. Previous examples have shown that the DGS can create positive change to eliminate structural biases. For example, in 1973, representatives of several Global South countries successfully included Arabic among the official languages of the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, the ICJ Fellowship Trust Fund mentioned above was a product of DGS that had an instant impact in increasing participation of fellows from Global South universities. For example, in regard to internships accessibility, international organisations need to adopt mechanisms that facilitate access to interns from developing countries and cover all the costs of the interns. Although voluntary trust funds would tremendously help interns from developing countries, it would not be enough. In this regard, DGS need to advocate to include interns’ costs in the mandatory budget of international organisations. Furthermore, DGS need to adopt institutional and legal checks and balances to ensure that at least 50 percent of interns are from the Global South. Moreover, in regard to staff of the ICJ, DGS, particularly those representing their countries at the Fifth Committee of the UN, should hold the ICJ accountable by checking that the ACABQ recommendations are being applied and to ensure that at least 50 percent of the staff of the Court come from the Global South countries. In regard to the official languages of the ICJ, since the Court is the judicial arm of the UN, the ICJ should adapt, as the UN have, to include all other official languages of the UN, in order to increase staff diversity and to reflect modern developments. Even though this will increase the overall costs of the Court, the UN member states should increase the Court’s budget according to this requirement as a means to enhance the diversity of international law.
To draw a balance, in its work on identifying customary international law, the International Law Commission (ILC) has consistently underscored the need for evidence of practice and opinio juris being drawn from a wide representation of the world. The ILC has emphasized that customary rules cannot emerge solely from the practice of a few powerful or historically dominant states but must reflect the legal convictions of the international community as a whole. Yet, in practice, the structural and resource disparities between states often result in the views, practices, and legal positions of developing countries being underrepresented in the assessment of state practice. For example, the participation of countries of the Global South in treaty negotiations or annual sessions of international organisations is also subject to the availability of voluntary trust funds which relies on states’ contributions, and tends to be deficient which reduces the effective and efficient participation of countries of the Global South in the development of international law. Moreover, the ILC Chair in 2023 stressed that “there are still limitations in the number of participation of member States” and that it is crucial for all countries, regions, and legal systems of the world to participate in the eventual output of the ILC.
This showcases that institutional reforms are needed and feasible to ensure equitable representation, space for alternative legal traditions, and recognition of the Global South as co-authors of international legal norms.
Conclusion
The removal of structural barriers towards the Global South is an important milestone that would ensure a more balanced international legal system. Without addressing the structural biases within international law, it risks perpetuating a system where one region, not all countries, shape the law. This results in an erosion of trust in the system and the dominance of a few countries’ and ultimately leads to a unilateral and selective interpretation and application of international law.
Disclaimer: All views expressed are strictly my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institution I have studied or worked at.
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