Dr Erica Harper, Head of Research and Policy Studies, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights

It might not be Biden’s age or Trump’s criminal docket that decides the 2024 US presidential election — it could be migration. To understand these dynamics we need look no further than the crisis that has been enveloping New York City.

A quick recap: upon entering office, President Biden upended many Trump-era border restrictions, including halting construction of the infamous wall with Mexico and ending off-shore asylum processing. Within months the number of irregular entries through US southern borders had risen to rates last seen in the 1990s. In the 2021 fiscal year, border patrol services reported 1.6 million ‘encounters’, and this number increased to 2.3 million in 2022. The trend continued through 2023, both in anticipation and as a consequence of Title 42 (a public health law leveraged during the Covid-19 pandemic to restrict asylum claims) expiring.

Then, in what started as political posturing, Texas began bussing arrivals to traditionally ‘blue’ states such as Chicago, New York and California. New York shouldered the brunt of this, due to both its highly diverse population and right to shelter policy. This decree, which dates back to 1981, entitles any individual, irrespective of their income or place of origin, to short-term housing and support including access to legal, health and education services. But the influx — over 113,000 persons in the past 18 months — has stretched relief centres beyond capacity with arrivals having to be housed in hotels, tents erected in parks, and (most controversially) public school facilities. In September, democratic governor Kathy Hochul termed the situation an “unprecedented migrant crisis”, and demanded a federal government response. Specifically, she wanted migrants to have access to the formal labour market, for example by extending them Temporary Protection Status (TPS). Her logic was twofold. With the option of legal employment, entrants would gravitate towards states with labour gaps thus facilitating a more even burden sharing across the country. And even for those who remained in New York, once in jobs their dependence on city-funded services would reduce. 

The Biden administration was reluctant to pursue this solution, concerned that a ‘band aid’ fix for New York would fuel a larger problem by enhancing the attractiveness of the US to irregular migration more generally. In late September, however, pressure from within the democratic party resulted in an unlikely move. TPS was extended and redesignated for Venezuela, benefiting up to 472,000 individuals already in-country.

Commentary around these events has been levelled almost exclusively through a political lens — in short, will the decision be sufficient to placate key democrats, or did it simply hand republicans political fodder leading into presidential debates? Less attention paid to the concomitant policy implications, in particular from an economic, legal and multilateral perspective. A review of this evidence reveals quite a different story. In short, Biden’s TPS decision may not just have been an act of politically savvy, but also one that was economically shrewd. Europe, please take note.

The Changing Face of Global Migration

The current wave of irregular migration, its drivers and the government’s response are worth unpacking, because while the situation is happening in the US, it is not about the US. Instead, it speaks to an historical shift in the nature of global migration — a seachange that is rooted in inequality, lack of opportunity and (ever-increasingly) the climate crisis.

Rewind a decade, and Europe was navigating a similar dilemma. The situation reached a tipping point in 2015 with one million individuals journeying across the Mediterranean Sea over a 12-month period. These numbers were pushed down relatively quickly, the 2017-2020 period averaging 120,000 sea arrivals annually. This was achieved through a legally controversial combination of strict policy measures (including asset confiscation and border closures between European states), deals brokered with countries of departure (including to turnaround boats before they entered international waters) and a little bit of luck (mainly in the form of policy and community responses to COVID-19). But this status quo is wavering. Since 2020, numbers have increased steadily; Italy alone has received more than 133,000 entrants in 2023, which is double that of the equivalent period last year. As underscored by the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, brokered between the European Parliament and Council in December 2023, these issues remain politically charged and are potential electoral game-changers.

Like in the US, Europe’s wave of irregular arrivals has two unique characteristics. First, while they undoubtedly arrive from dire situations, they are not generally fleeing armed conflict. Second, entrants are covering significant territory to reach their destinations. In Europe the lead countries of origin are Tunisia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire and Syria, while in the US entrants originating from outside North-Central America has risen from 4 to 43 percent over the past five years.

Together these factors speak to a disquieting conclusion: in the absence of opportunity, social mobility and/or a pathway out of poverty, refugees and others will seek better conditions elsewhere, and take great risks to enable this. Indeed, the oft-quoted sentiment “I’m dead anyway” should not be dismissed as hyperbole — since 2015 more than 22,000 have died or gone missing in their attempts to enter Europe. This state of affairs should give us all pause. That such a large volume of individuals is willing to risk their lives and savings (sometimes an entire family’s assets) speaks to an inconceivable level of human hardship.

At some point in the not-so-distant future, states in the global north will need to address these changing dynamics with more than stop-gap measures. And while immigration is an inherently political and polarizing issue, it is important that decisions are not made solely on this basis. Evidence must also play a role. Two realities are worth highlighting.

Utilitarian Arguments for Economic integration

First, President Biden’s decision to open labour markets to Venezuelans is not necessarily unwise, and Europe should keep in mind why. We know from the refugee scholarship that absorbing a large and unexpected population movement will most often be fiscally problematic and politically unpopular. This said, there are certain contexts where a host state economy will benefit from an injection of fresh labour. The most obvious example is in countries with ageing populations or negative population growth rates; another is economies with labour gaps that nationals cannot or are not willing to occupy. When new market entrants fill such gaps, they stimulate sectorial growth and provide nationals with the conditions needed for upward occupational mobility. This is important for reasons beyond sectorial sustainability and national productivity. The presence of newcomers in these roles opens inroads for the creation of new, value-added opportunities, which nationals are often better positioned and motivated to fill. There is even some evidence that an increasing proportion of professional positions available to nationals vis-à-vis low-skilled and labour-intensive jobs encourages nationals to invest in education and skills-building. Finally, where a labour supply injection brings new skills, this can facilitate diversification, or a process of structural change to shift production towards more value-added and knowledge-intense activities. In each of these growth scenarios, the weight of evidence is that while local wages may fall to begin with, over time the economy will be flexible enough to absorb additional labour, and wages recover to their initial levels.

If we apply these prerequisites to the US economy, there is an almost perfect fit. Unemployment is at an historical low, the population aged over 65 (16.8 percent of the population) is growing at the fastest rate in 130 years, and fertility rates have bottomed out to reach an all-time dip of 1.64 live births per woman (as at 2020). The same trends are true for Europe.

But perhaps even more compelling is what is likely to happen in these economies in the coming decades. Innovations in machine learning and generative artificial intelligence mean that new jobs will be technology-based, and mainly suited to youthful and educated workers. This supports the ‘upwards shift’ argument, driven by newcomers to the economy. Discontents might highlight that these same trends will cause sectorial redundancy, including in educated professions such as teaching, finance, media and healthcare — not exactly a time to add even more people to unemployment queues. The truth of the matter, however, is that while this is a problem, such displaced workers will not be suited to down-skilling. They will require a solution, but manufacturing and service jobs is not it.

A Draconian Approach to Border Control is Costly Too

The second thing that governments on both sides of the pond should bear in mind is that in the current context, measures likely to dissuade irregular migration will need to be fairly harsh, and this will come with its own set of costs.

Over the past two decades, governments seeking to crack down on irregular migration have built walls, externalized asylum processing to offshore locations and brokered financial deals with states of departure. With the exception of Trump’s wall, these measures do seem to produce the desired effect, especially when an unsuccessful attempt legally bars the individual from the country in question. Under the terms of the UK’s agreement with Rwanda, individuals found to have valid asylum claims would not be returned to the UK but instead integrated into in the small (and poor) African state. Likewise in Australia, people who attempt to enter by boat face a lifetime ban, irrespective of their subsequent refugee status. Results, however, do not come cheap. Australia’s offshore processing operations in Nauru cost AUD350 million annually, while the UK-Rwanda deal (had it not been blocked by the courts) saw it contributing USD152,000 million in development assistance and covering the direct costs of asylee processing and integration (an estimated USD213,000/individual).  

‘Deal brokering’ is also contagious. Europe’s 6 billion euro agreement with Turkey to stem unauthorized sea entries into Europe — while impactful — lit a fire under states in similar hosting situations with Libya and Kenya securing their own ‘arrangements’ within a matter of months.

Other costs are more difficult to quantify. The most important have a human face — ill-treatment, violence and the stripping of dignity. From a more technical perspective, even when dissuasive measures are successful at reducing arrivals, this effectiveness spills over to also reduce the movement of migrants who have a right under international law to seek and receive protection. Moreover, crackdown approaches route everyone towards unsafe options including unseaworthy boats, availing of people smugglers and separating children from their parents.

Finally, the stability of the humanitarian protection architecture must be considered. Off-shore processing is incompatible with human rights law and non-compliant with the Refugee Convention (1951). Such obligation shirking plays badly with just about everyone. It is considered especially hypocritical by traditional refugee hosting states which have long faced pressure to keep their borders open during far graver and longer-term influxes, all on the basis of good international citizenship. While it is unclear how these dynamics will play out, it no doubt erodes the integrity of international law and the multilateral rights system.

Some Final Words

Today, states in the global north are bearing witness to an unprecedented transition in the nature of global migration. These trends will most likely continue, with proportionally fewer seeking protection from war and persecution vis-à-vis the number fleeing situations devoid of opportunity, livelihoods and hope for a better future. The potential volume of this movement, coupled with discretionary nature of state migration policy, mean that how governments choose to navigate this shift will have enormous implications, including for global inequality, north-south relations and the international protection framework.

Of course, the crafting of migration policy is a highly complex process. Along with the economic considerations briefly set out in this paper, governments will also consider issues around social cohesion, security, voter sentiment and remittance flows, to name a few. But decisions can be made from a position of fear and protectionism, or with a view to brokering solutions that are fair, respect international law and acknowledge the disproportionate role that has been played by host states in the global south in managing irregular population movements in all their forms.

The upshot is that integrating an unexpected population movement is never easy, often unpopular and always political. But ceteris paribus, where integration makes objective economic sense, states should take this seriously. Any other move risks irregular migration escalating into a ‘Haves v. Have Nots’ confrontation at time where the multilateral system is already struggling with polarization and discord.